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Abstract
This paper is concerned with a backward-forward stochastic differential equation (BFSDE)
system, in which a large number of negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state
average. Here some BSDE is introduced as the dynamics of major player, while dynamics
of minor players are described by SDEs. Some auxiliary mean-field SDEs (MFSDEs) and a
3× 2 mixed forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system are consid-
ered and analyzed instead of involving the fixed-point analysis as in other mean-field games.
We also derive the decentralized strategies which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property.
Key words: BFSDE, Consistency condition, Decentralized control, ǫ-Nash equilibrium,
Large-population system, Mean-field game
1 Introduction
In recent years, within the context of noncooperative game theory, the dynamic optimization or
control of stochastic large-population (LP) system has attracted consistent and intense attentions
in a variety of fields including biology, engineering, operational research, mathematical finance
and economics, social science, etc. The most special feature of controlled LP system lies in
the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are
coupled via the state-average across the whole population. To design low-complexity strategies,
one efficient methodology is the associated mean-field games which enable us to obtain the
decentralized control. Readers may refer [14] for the motivation and methodology, and [5]
for recent progress in mean-field game theory. Besides, some other recent literature include
[2, 3, 7, 11–13, 15] for linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games of large-population
system, [21] for risk sensitive mean-field games. In contrast to previous work, in [10] M. Huang
discussed large population systems with major and minor players by analyzing the case in an
infinite set where the minor players are from a total of K classes. Later on, Nguyen and
Huang [17] considered an LQ problem by directly treating the mean field z in the population
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limit as a random process with random coefficients. In addition, J. Yong [24] investigated a
leader-follower hierarchical game with open-loop information.
In reality, major player (the government, for example) may expect to obtain some recursive
utilities who also has a significant role in affecting all minor players. For this kind of model,
some backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) is introduced as the dynamics of major
player. Bismut [4] introduced BSDEs as the adjoint equations. Pardoux and Peng first proved
the existence and uniqueness of solution for nonlinear BSDEs in [18], which has been extensively
used in stochastic control and mathematical finance. Independently, Duffie and Epstein [8]
introduced BSDEs under economic background. Then El Karoui, Peng and Quenez gave the
formulation of recursive utilities from the BSDE point of view. As found by [9], the recursive
utility process can be regarded as a solution of BSDE.
Furthermore, with common forward dynamics of minor players, in this paper we derive a
backward-forward stochastic differential equation (BFSDE) system, in which a large number
of negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state average. We discuss the related
mean-field LQG games and derive the decentralized strategies which are shown to satisfy the
ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. A stochastic process which relates to the state of major player is
introduced here to be the approximation of the state-average process. Some auxiliary mean-
field stochastic differential equations (MFSDEs) and a 3× 2 mixed forward-backward stochastic
differential equation (FBSDE) system are considered and analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the large population LQG
games of backward-forward systems. In Section 3, we derive the optimal control of auxiliary track
system and the consistency conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the related ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes our work.
2 Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by Rm the m-dimensional Euclidean space. Consider a finite
time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Suppose (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete filtered proba-
bility space on which a standard (d+m×N)-dimensional Brownian motion {W0(t),Wi(t), 1 ≤
i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is defined. Fw0t := σ{W0(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, Fwit := σ{Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
F it := σ{W0(s),Wi(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Here, {Fw0t }0≤t≤T stands for the information of the major
player; while {Fwit }0≤t≤T the individual information of ith minor player. For a given filtra-
tion {Gt}0≤t≤T , let L2Gt(0, T ;Rm) denote the space of all Gt-progressively measurable processes
with values in Rm satisfying E
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt < +∞; L2(0, T ;Rm) the space of all deterministic
functions defined on [0, T ] in Rm satisfying
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt < +∞; C(0, T ;Rm) the space of all
continuous functions defined on [0, T ] in Rm. For simplicity, in what follows we focus on the
1-dimensional processes, which means d = m = 1.
Consider an large population system with (1 + N) individual agents, denoted by A0 and
{Ai}1≤i≤N , where A0 stands for the major player, while Ai stands for ith minor player. The
dynamics of A0 is given by a BSDE as follows:{
dx0(t) =
[
A0x0(t) +B0u0(t) + C0z0(t)
]
dt+ z0(t)dW0(t),
x0(T ) =ξ
(1)
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where ξ ∈ Fw0T satisfies E|ξ|2 < +∞. The state of minor player Ai is a SDE satisfying{
dxi(t) =
[
Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Dx
(N)(t) + αx0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
xi(0) =xi0
(2)
where x(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t) is the state-average of minor players; xi0 is the initial value of
Ai. Here, A0, B0, C0, A,B,D,α, σ are scalar constants. Assume that Ft is the augmentation
of σ{W0(s),Wi(s), xi0; 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} by all the P -null sets of F , which is the full
information accessible to the large population system up to time t. The admissible control
strategy u0 ∈ U0, ui ∈ Ui where
U0 ,
{
u0|u0(t) ∈ L2Fw0t (0, T ;R)
}
,
and
Ui ,
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ L2Ft(0, T ;R)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Let u = (u0, u1, · · · , uN ) denote the set of control strategies of all (1 + N) agents; u−i =
(u0, u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · · uN ) the control strategies except ith agent Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. The cost
functional for A0 is given by
J0(u0(·), u−0(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q0
(
x0(t)− x(N)(t)
)2
+R0u
2
0(t)
]
dt+H0x
2
0(0)
}
(3)
where Q0 ≥ 0, R0 > 0,H0 ≥ 0. The individual cost functional for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N is
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xi(t)− x(N)(t)
)2
+Ru2i (t)
]
dt+Hx2i (T )
}
(4)
where Q ≥ 0, R > 0,H ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1 Unlike the systems introduced in [10,17], the dynamics of major player is a BSDE.
The term H0x
2
0(0) is introduced in (3) to denote some recursive evaluation or nonlinear expec-
tation. One practical meaning is the initial hedging deposits in the pension fund industry. For
simplicity, behaviors of major player (the government, as an example) affect the state of each
minor player (the peasant); while the state-average of minor players appears only in the cost
functional of major player.
We introduce the following assumption:
(H1) {xi0}Ni=1 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with Exi0 = x, E|xi0|2 < +∞,
and also independent of {W0,Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
Now, we formulate the large population dynamic optimization problem.
Problem (I). Find a control strategies set u¯ = (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯N ) which satisfies
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui∈Ui
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·))
where u¯−i represents (u¯0, u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ), 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
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3 The Limiting Optimal Control and NCE Equation System
To study Problem (I), one efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games via
limiting problem when the agent number N tends to infinity. For a given stochastic triple
(x¯(·), k(·), β0(·)) ∈ L2Fw0t (0, T ;R), suppose x
(N)(·) is approximated by x¯(·) as N → +∞.
Introduce the following auxiliary dynamics of major and minor players, still denote by
x0(·), xi(·) respectively:

dx0(t) =
[
A0x0(t) +B0u0(t) + C0z0(t)
]
dt+ z0(t)dW0(t),
x0(T ) = ξ,
dx¯(t) =
[
A¯x¯(t) + B¯x0(t) + C¯k(t)
]
dt,
x¯(0) = x,
dk(t) =
[
A˜k(t) + B˜x¯(t) + C˜x0(t)
]
dt+ β0(t)dW0(t),
k(T ) = 0
(5)
and {
dxi(t) =
[
Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Dx¯(t) + αx0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
xi(0) =xi0.
(6)
Here ϕ¯ and ϕ˜, ϕ = A,B,C are to be determined. The associated limiting cost functionals
become
J¯0(u0(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q0
(
x0(t)− x¯(t)
)2
+R0u
2
0(t)
]
dt+H0x
2
0(0)
}
(7)
and
J¯i(ui(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xi(t)− x¯(t)
)2
+Ru2i (t)
]
dt+Hx2i (T )
}
. (8)
Remark 3.1 Due to the reason that the state-average of minor players appears only in the
cost functional of major player, the first equation in (5) has the same form with (1) actually.
However, for regularity, we still write it out.
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game (II) as follows.
Problem (II). For ith agent Ai, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N, find u¯i ∈ Ui satisfying
J¯i(u¯i(·)) = inf
ui∈Ui
J¯i(ui(·)). (9)
u¯i satisfying (9) is called an optimal control for (II).
To get the optimal control of Problem (II), we should obtain the optimal control of A0 first.
For this aim, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Corresponding to the forward-backward system (5) and (7), the optimal control of
A0 for (II) is given by
u¯0(t) = −B0R−10 p0(t) (10)
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where the adjoint process p0(·) and the corresponding optimal trajectory (xˆ0(·), zˆ0(·)) satisfy the
following Hamilton system

dxˆ0(t) =
[
A0xˆ0(t)−B20R−10 p0(t) + C0zˆ0(t)
]
dt+ zˆ0(t)dW0(t),
dx¯(t) =
[
A¯x¯(t) + B¯xˆ0(t) + C¯k(t)
]
dt,
dk(t) =
[
A˜k(t) + B˜x¯(t) + C˜xˆ0(t)
]
dt+ β(t)dW0(t),
dp0(t) =
[−A0p0(t)−Q0(xˆ0(t)− x¯(t))− B¯p(t)− C˜q(t)]dt− C0p0(t)dW0(t),
dp(t) =
[− A¯p(t) +Q0(xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)) − B˜q(t)]dt+ β¯(t)dW0(t),
dq(t) =
(− A˜q(t)− C¯p(t))dt,
xˆ0(T ) = ξ, x¯(0) = x, k(T ) = 0, p0(0) = −H0xˆ0(0), p(T ) = 0, q(0) = 0
(11)
where β(·), β¯(·) ∈ L2Fw0t (0, T ;R).
Proof. For the variation of control δu0(·) ∈ L2Fw0t (0, T ;R), introduce the following variational
equations: 

dδx0(t) =
[
A0δx0(t) +B0δu0(t) + C0δz0(t)
]
dt+ δz0(t)dW0(t),
dδx¯(t) =
[
A¯δx¯(t) + B¯δx0(t) + C¯δk(t)
]
dt,
dδk(t) =
[
A˜δk(t) + B˜δx¯(t) + C˜δx0(t)
]
dt+ δβ0(t)dW0(t),
δx0(T ) = 0, δx¯(0) = 0, δk(T ) = 0.
(12)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to p0(t)δx0(t)+p(t)δx¯(t)+q(t)δk(t) and noting the associated first order
variation of cost functional :
0 = δJ¯0(u¯0) = E
{∫ T
0
[
Q0
(
xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)
)(
δx0(t)− δx¯(t)
)
+R0u¯0(t)δu0(t)
]
dt+H0xˆ0(0)δx0(0)
}
,
we obtain the optimal control (10). Combining all state and adjoint equations, and applying
u¯0(·) to A0, we get the Hamilton system (11). 
After obtaining the optimal control of major player A0, we aim to get the optimal control
of minor player Ai corresponding to xˆ0(·) respectively.
Lemma 3.2 Under (H1), the optimal control of Ai for (II) is
u¯i(t) = −BR−1pi(t) (13)
where the adjoint process pi(·) and the corresponding optimal trajectory xˆi(·) satisfy the BSDE{
dpi(t) =
[−Api(t)−Q(xˆi(t)− x¯(t))]dt+ β0(t)dW0(t) + βi(t)dWi(t),
pi(T ) =Hxˆi(T )
(14)
and SDE {
dxˆi(t) =
[
Axˆi(t)−B2R−1pi(t) +Dx¯(t) + αxˆ0(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t),
xˆi(0) =xi0.
(15)
Here β0(·), βi(·) ∈ L2F it (0, T ;R); xˆ0(·) and x¯(·) are given by (11). For the coupled BFSDE (14)
and (15), we are going to decouple it and trying to derive the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE)
system satisfied by the decentralized control policy. Then we have
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Lemma 3.3 Suppose P (·) is the unique solution of the following Riccati equation system{
P˙ (t) + 2AP (t)−B2R−1P 2(t) +Q = 0,
P (T ) = H,
(16)
we obtain a revisionary Hamilton system:

dxˆ0(t) =
[
A0xˆ0(t)−B20R−10 p0(t) +C0zˆ0(t)
]
dt+ zˆ0(t)dW0(t),
dx¯(t) =
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))x¯(t)−B2R−1k(t) + αxˆ0(t)]dt,
dk(t) =
[(−A+B2R−1P (t))k(t) + (Q−DP (t))x¯(t)− αP (t)xˆ0(t)]dt+ β0(t)dW0(t),
dp0(t) =
[−A0p0(t)−Q0(xˆ0(t)− x¯(t))− αp(t) + αP (t)q(t)]dt− C0p0(t)dW0(t),
dp(t) =
[− (A+D −B2R−1P (t))p(t) +Q0(xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)) − (Q−DP (t))q(t)]dt
+ β¯(t)dW0(t),
dq(t) =
[(
A−B2R−1P (t))q(t) +B2R−1p(t)]dt,
xˆ0(T ) = ξ, x¯(0) = x, k(T ) = 0, p0(0) = −H0xˆ0(0), p(T ) = 0, q(0) = 0
(17)
which is a triple FBSDE (TFBSDE for short).
Proof. Suppose
pi(t) = Pi(t)xˆi(t) + fi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N
where Pi(·), fi(·) are to be determined. The terminal condition pi(T ) = Hxˆi(T ) implies that
Pi(T ) = H, fi(T ) = 0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to Pi(t)xˆi(t) + fi(t), we have
dpi(t) =
[
P˙i(t) +APi(t)−B2R−1P 2i (t)
]
xˆi(t)dt
+
[
DPi(t)x¯(t)−B2R−1Pi(t)fi(t) + αPi(t)xˆ0(t)
]
dt+ dfi(t) + σPi(t)dWi(t).
Comparing the coefficients with (14), we get βi(t) = σPi(t),{
P˙i(t) + 2APi(t)−B2R−1P 2i (t) +Q = 0,
Pi(T ) = H
(18)
and 

dfi(t) =
[(−A+B2R−1Pi(t))fi(t) + (Q−DPi(t))x¯(t)− αPi(t)xˆ0(t)]dt
+ β0(t)dW0(t),
fi(T ) =0.
(19)
Noting that Riccati equation (18) is symmetric, it is known that (18) admits a unique nonnega-
tive bounded solution Pi(·) (see [ma,yong]). Further we get that P1(·) = P2(·) = · · · = PN (·) :=
P (·). Then (18) coincides with (16). Besides, if the linear BSDE (19) admits a unique solution
fi(·) ∈ L2Fw0t (0, T ;R), we denote fi(·) := f(·), i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Thus, the decentralized feedback strategy for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N is written as
ui(t) = −BR−1
(
P (t)xi(t) + f(t)
)
(20)
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where xi(·) and the associated x0(·) are given by (2) and (1) respectively. Plugging (20) into
(2) implies the centralized closed-loop state:
 dxi(t) =
[(
A−B2R−1P (t))xi(t)−B2R−1f(t) +Dx(N)(t) + αx0(t)]dt+ σdWi(t),
xi(0) =xi0.
(21)
Taking summation, dividing by N and letting N → +∞, we get{
dx¯(t) =
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))x¯(t)−B2R−1f(t) + αx0(t)]dt,
x¯(0) =x.
(22)
Comparing the coefficients with (5), we have
A¯ = A+D −B2R−1P (·), B¯ = α, C¯ = −B2R−1, k(·) = f(·).
Then we obtain{
dk(t) =
[(−A+B2R−1P (t))k(t) + (Q−DP (t))x¯(t)− αP (t)x0(t)]dt+ β0(t)dW0(t),
k(T ) =0.
From (5), it follows that
A˜ = −A+B2R−1P (·), B˜ = Q−DP (·), C˜ = −αP (·).
Then (17) is obtained, which completes the proof. 
About the wellposedness of (17), we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose B0 6= 0, then TFBSDE (17) is uniquely solvable.
Remark 3.2 In what follows (17) is called the NCE system. By Theorem 3.1 we know that
there exists a unique 6-tuple solution (x¯(·), p0(·), q(·), p(·), xˆ0(·), k(·)) which can be obtained
outline. Thus it is equivalent with the fixed point principle. To our best knowledge, it is the
first time to focus on the wellposedness of TFBSDE in large population problems. It is of great
feature and meaningful.
4 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal control u¯i(·), 0 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (II) through the
consistency condition system. Now we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (I). To
start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 A set of controls uk ∈ Uk, 0 ≤ k ≤ N, for (N +1) agents is called to satisfy an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs Jk, 0 ≤ k ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for
any fixed 0 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
Ji(ui, u−i) ≤ Ji(u′i, u−i) + ǫ (23)
when any alternative control u′i ∈ Ui is applied by Ai.
7
If ǫ = 0, then Definition 4.1 is reduced to the usual Nash equilibrium. Now, we state the main
result of this paper and its proof will be given later.
Theorem 4.1 Under (H1), (u˜0, u˜1, u˜2, · · · , u˜N ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of (I). Here,
u˜0 is given by
u˜0(t) = −B0R−10 p0(t) (24)
where p0(·) is obtained outline by (17); while for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, u˜i is
u˜i(t) = −BR−1P (t)x˜i(t)−BR−1k(t) (25)
where x˜i(·), the decentralized state trajectory for Ai, satisfies (21).
The proof of above theorem needs several lemmas which are presented later. Denote by (x˜0(·), z˜0(·))
the centralized state trajectory; (xˆ0(·), zˆ0(·)) the decentralized one. Applying u˜0(·) to A0 and
using the notations given above, it is easy to get that (x˜0(·), z˜0(·)) ≡ (xˆ0(·), zˆ0(·)). Further,
(x¯(·), k(·))x˜0 = (x¯(·), k(·))xˆ0 . The cost functional in centralized case and decentralized one are
given by
J0(u˜0(·), u˜−0(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q0
(
x˜0(t)− x˜(N)(t)
)2
+R0u˜
2
0(t)
]
dt+H0x˜
2
0(0)
}
(26)
and
J¯0(u¯0(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q0
(
xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0
)2
+R0u¯
2
0(t)
]
dt+H0xˆ
2
0(0)
}
(27)
respectively. For Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have the following close-loop system{
dx˜i(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))x˜i(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 +Dx˜(N)(t) + αx˜0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
x˜i(0) =xi0
(28)
with the cost functional
Ji(u˜i(·), u˜−i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
x˜i(t)− x˜(N)(t)
)2
+Ru˜2i (t)
]
dt+Hx˜2i (T )
}
(29)
where x˜(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
x˜i(t). The auxiliary system (of limiting problem) is given by
{
dxˆi(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))xˆi(t)−B2R−1k(t)xˆ0 +Dx¯(t)xˆ0 + αxˆ0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
xˆi(0) =xi0
(30)
with the cost functional
Ji(u¯i(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q
(
xˆi(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0
)2
+Ru¯2i (t)
]
dt+Hxˆ2i (T )
}
(31)
where (x¯(t)xˆ0 , k(t)xˆ0) satisfies (17). We have
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Lemma 4.1
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣∣2 = O( 1N
)
, (32)
∣∣∣J0(u˜0, u˜−0)− J¯0(u¯0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (33)
Proof. By (28), we have

dx˜(N)(t) =
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))x˜(N)(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 + αx˜0(t)]dt+ 1N
N∑
i=1
σdWi(t),
x˜(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0 := x
(N)
0 .
Noting that
E
∣∣∣x(N)0 − x∣∣∣2 = E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= O
( 1
N
)
,
by (17) and Gronwall’s inequality, we get (32).
It is easily got that sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆ0(t) − x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2 < +∞. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣∣∣x˜0(t)− x˜(N)(t)∣∣2 − ∣∣xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜0(t)− x˜(N)(t)− xˆ0(t) + x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2
+ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E
[∣∣xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣∣∣x˜0(t)− x˜(N)(t)− xˆ0(t) + x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣]
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜0(t)− xˆ0(t)− (x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)∣∣2
+ 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆ0(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2) 12( sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣x˜0(t)− xˆ0(t)− (x˜(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)∣∣2) 12
=O
( 1√
N
)
.
(34)
In addition, by (10) and (24), we have u˜0(·) = uˆ0(·). Thus (33) is obtained. 
For minor players, we have the following estimates:
Lemma 4.2
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x˜i(t)− xˆi(t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (35)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣u˜i(t)− u¯i(t)∣∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (36)
∣∣∣Ji(u˜i, u˜−i)− J¯i(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (37)
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Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, applying Gronwall’s inequality, we get (35) from (32). (36) follows
from (35) obviously. Using the same technique as (34) and noting sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆi(t) − x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2 <
+∞, sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣u¯i(t)∣∣2 < +∞, sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆi(t)∣∣2 < +∞, we obtain (37). 
Until now, we have addressed some estimates of states and costs corresponding to control u˜i
and u¯i,0 ≤ i ≤ N . Next we will focus on the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (I). Consider a perturbed
control u0 ∈ U0 for A0 and introduce some notations as{
dl0(t) =
[
A0l0(t) +B0u0(t) + C0q0(t)
]
dt+ q0(t)dW0(t),
x0(T ) =ξ
(38)
whereas minor players keep the control u˜i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, i.e.,{
dli(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))li(t)−B2R−1k(t)l0 +Dl(N)(t) + αl0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
li(0) =xi0
(39)
where l(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
k=1
lk(t); k(t)l0 associated with l0 satisfying


dk(t)l0 =
[(−A+B2R−1P (t))k(t)l0 + (Q−DP (t))x¯(t)l0 − αP (t)l0(t)]dt
+ β0(t)dW0(t),
dx¯(t)l0 =
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))x¯(t)l0 −B2R−1k(t)l0 + αl0(t)]dt,
k(T )l0 = 0, x¯(0)l0 = x.
(40)
And for any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider a perturbed control ui ∈ Ui for Ai, whereas major and
other minor players keep the control u˜j, 0 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i. Introduce{
dmi(t) =
[
Ami(t) +Bui(t) +Dm
(N)(t) + αx˜0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
mi(0) =xi0
(41)
and{
dmj(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))mj(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 +Dm(N)(t) + αx˜0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
mj(0) =xj0
(42)
where m(N)(t) = 1
N
N∑
k=1
mk(t); k(t)x˜0 satisfying (17) because of x˜0 = xˆ0.
If u˜j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to cost Jj , it holds that
Jj(u˜j , u˜−j) ≥ inf
uj∈Uj
Ji(uj , u˜−j) ≥ Jj(u˜j , u˜−j)− ǫ.
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider uj ∈ Uj such that Jj(uj , u˜−j) ≤
Jj(u˜j , u˜−j), which implies
1
2
E
∫ T
0
Ru2j(t)dt ≤ Jj(ui, u˜−j) ≤ Jj(u˜j , u˜−j) = J¯j(u¯j) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
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In the limiting cost functional J¯j , by the optimality of (x¯j , u¯j), we get that (x¯j , u¯j) is L
2-bounded.
Then we obtain the boundedness of J¯j(u¯j), i.e.,
E
∫ T
0
u2j(t)dt ≤ C, 0 ≤ j ≤ N (43)
where C is a positive constant and independent of N . Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l0(t)∣∣2, sup
1≤k≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣lk(t)∣∣2
]
, sup
1≤k≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣mk(t)∣∣2
]
are bounded.
Proof. By (43), using the usual technique of BSDE, we get the boundedness of sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l0(t)∣∣2.
It follows from (39) that
E
[ N∑
k=1
|lk(t)|2
]
≤C1
{
E
[ N∑
k=1
|xk0|2
]
+ E
∫ t
0
[ N∑
k=1
|lk(s)l0 |2 +N |k(s)|2 +N |l0(s)|2
]
ds
+
N∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σdWk(s)
∣∣∣2
}
.
By (41) and (42), it holds that
E
[ N∑
k=1
|mk(t)|2
]
≤C2
{
E
[ N∑
k=1
|xk0|2
]
+ E
∫ t
0
[ N∑
k=1
|mk(s)|2 + |ui(s)|2 +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
|u˜k(s)|2
+N |x˜0(s)|2
]
ds+
N∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σdWk(s)
∣∣∣2
}
.
Here, C1, C2 are both positive constants. Since sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l0(t)∣∣2 is bounded, we get the bound-
edness of sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣k(t)l0∣∣2 by (40). It follows from (43) that E|ui(t)|2 is bounded. Besides, the
optimal controls u˜k(t), k 6= i is L2-bounded. Then by Gronwall’s inequality, it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
[
N∑
k=1
|lk(t)|2
]
= sup
0≤t≤T
E
[
N∑
k=1
|mk(t)|2
]
= O(N).
Hence for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N, sup
0≤t≤T
E|lk(t)|2 and sup
0≤t≤T
E|mk(t)|2 are bounded. 
Correspondingly, the system for agent A0 under control u0 in (II) is as follows{
dl′0(t) =
[
A0l
′
0(t) +B0u0(t) + C0q
′
0(t)
]
dt+ q′0(t)dW0(t),
x′0(T ) =ξ
(44)
and for agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,{
dlˆi(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))lˆi(t)−B2R−1k(t)l′
0
+Dx¯(t)l′
0
+ αl′0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
lˆi(0) =xi0.
(45)
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where (k(t)l′
0
, x¯(t)l′
0
) associated with l′0 satisfying

dk(t)l′
0
=
[(−A+B2R−1P (t))k(t)l′
0
+
(
Q−DP (t))x¯(t)l′
0
− αP (t)l′0(t)
]
dt
+ β0(t)dW0(t),
dx¯(t)l′
0
=
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))x¯(t)l′
0
−B2R−1k(t)l′
0
+ αl′0(t)
]
dt,
k(T )l′
0
= 0, x¯(0)l′
0
= x.
(46)
Then we have
Lemma 4.3
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣l(N)(t)− x¯(t)l′
0
∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (47)
∣∣∣J0(u0, u˜−0)− J¯0(u0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (48)
Proof. From (38) and (44), by the existence and uniqueness of BSDE, we have (l′0, q
′
0) = (l0, q0).
Further, noting FBSDE (40) and (46), we get (k(t)l′
0
, x¯(t)l′
0
) = (k(t)l0 , x¯(t)l0).
From (39), it follows that

dl(N)(t) =
[(
A+D −B2R−1P (t))l(N)(t)−B2R−1k(t)l0 + αl0(t)]dt+ 1N
N∑
i=1
σdWi(t),
l(N)(0) =x
(N)
0 .
Noting (46) and
E
∣∣∣x(N)0 − x0∣∣∣2 = E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= O
( 1
N
)
,
and applying Gronwall’s inequality, we get (47). Using the same technique as Lemma 4.1 and
noting sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣l′0(t)− x¯(t)l′0∣∣2 < +∞, we obtain (48). 
Now, we will focus on the difference for the perturbed control and optimal control of minor
players. Given the system for agent Ai under control ui in (II) is{
dm′i(t) =
[
Am′i(t) +Bui(t) +Dx¯(t)xˆ0 + αxˆ0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
m′i(0) =xi0
(49)
and for agent Aj, j 6= i,{
dmˆj(t) =
[
(A−B2R−1P (t))mˆj(t)−B2R−1k(t)xˆ0 +Dx¯(t)xˆ0 + αxˆ0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
mˆj(0) =xj0
(50)
where (x¯(t)x˜0 , k(t)x˜0) satisfying (17) because of x˜0 = xˆ0.
In order to give necessary estimates in (I) and (II), we also introduce some intermediate
states as 

dmˇi(t) =
[
Amˇi(t) +Bui(t) +
N − 1
N
Dmˇ(N−1)(t) + αx˜0(t)
]
dt+ σdWi(t),
mˇi(0) =xi0
(51)
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and for j 6= i,

dmˇj(t) =
[(
A−B2R−1P (t)
)
mˇj(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 +
N − 1
N
Dmˇ(N−1)(t) + αx˜0(t)
]
dt
+ σdWj(t),
mˇj(0) =xj0
(52)
where mˇ(N−1)(t) = 1
N−1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
mˇj(t).
Denoting m(N−1)(t) = 1
N−1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
mj(t), by (42) and (52), we get


dm(N−1)(t) =
[(
A−B2R−1P (t) + N − 1
N
D
)
m(N−1)(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 + αx˜0(t) +
D
N
mi(t)
]
dt
+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σdWj(t),
m(N−1)(0) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj0 := x
(N−1)
0
(53)
and

dmˇ(N−1)(t) =
[(
A−B2R−1P (t) + N − 1
N
D
)
mˇ(N−1)(t)−B2R−1k(t)x˜0 + αx˜0(t)
]
dt
+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σdWj(t),
mˇ(N−1)(0) =x(N−1)0 .
(54)
We have the following estimates on these states.
Proposition 4.2
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣m(N−1)(t)− mˇ(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N2
)
, (55)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣m(N)(t)−m(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (56)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣mˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣∣2 = O( 1N
)
. (57)
Proof. From (53)-(54), applying Proposition 4.1 and Gronwall’s inequality, the assertion (55)
holds. (56) follows from assumption (H1) and the L2-boundness of controls ui(·) and u˜j(·), j 6= i.
From (54) and (17), noting (x¯(t)x˜0 , k(t)x˜0 , x˜0) = (x¯(t)xˆ0 , k(t)xˆ0 , xˆ0), we get

d
(
mˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0
)
=
[N − 1
N
D
(
mˇ(N−1)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0
)− D
N
x¯(t)xˆ0
]
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σdWj(t),
mˇ(N−1)(0)− x¯(0)xˆ0 =x(N−1)0 − x.
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Thus, (57) is obtained. 
Based on Proposition 4.2, we obtain more direct estimates to prove Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.4 For fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣m(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣∣2 = O( 1N
)
, (58)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣mi(t)−m′i(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1N
)
, (59)
∣∣∣Ji(ui, u˜−i)− J¯i(ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (60)
Proof. (58) follows from Proposition 4.2 directly. From (41) and (49), we get (59) by applying
the result of (58). Further, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|mi(t)|2 − |m′i(t)|2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
In addition,
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣(mi(t)−m(N)(t))2 − (m′i(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣mi(t)−m′i(t)− (m(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)∣∣∣2
+ 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣m′i(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0∣∣2) 12( sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣mi(t)−m′i(t)− (m(N)(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)∣∣2) 12
=O
( 1√
N
)
.
Then we have ∣∣∣Ji(ui, u˜−i)− J¯i(ui)∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
E
∫ T
0
Q
∣∣∣(mi(t)−m(N)(t))2 − (m′i(t)− x¯(t)xˆ0)2∣∣∣dt
+
1
2
HE
∣∣∣m2i (T )− (m′i(T ))2∣∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
which implies (60). 
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for A0 and Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Combining (33) and (48), we have
J0(u˜0, u˜−0) = J¯0(u¯0) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J¯0(u0) +O
( 1√
N
)
= J0(u0, u˜−0) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
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While from (37) and (60), we get
Ji(u˜i, u˜−i) = J¯i(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J¯i(ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
= Ji(ui, u˜−i) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows by taking ǫ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the dynamics of major player is given by some BSDE, while dynamics of minor
players are described by SDEs. The BFSDE system is established in which a large number of
negligible agents are coupled in their dynamics via state average. Some auxiliary mean-field
SDEs (MFSDEs) and a 3 × 2 mixed FBSDE system are considered and analyzed instead of
involving the fixed-point analysis as in other mean-field games. The decentralized strategies are
derived, which are also shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. In the future, one
possible direction is that state-average appears in dynamics of major player, which may bring
lots of trouble in proving the ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Another direction is that dynamics of minor
players are backward and the consistent condition analysis may be more complicated. Numerical
computation and other applications in finance will also be investigated in the future work.
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